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RECENT DEVELOPMENT 
STATE V. WILLIAMS: A TRAFFIC STOP WILL BE 
CONSTITUTIONALLY PERMISSIBLE IF IT IS BASED ON 
OBSERVATIONS OF A POLICE OFFICER THAT GIVE 
REASONABLE ARTICULABLE SUSPICION THAT A 
TRAFFIC LAW HAS BEEN VIOLATED. 
By: David Jimenez 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that a traffic stop complies 
with the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution if the 
police officer making the stop has reasonable articulable suspicion that 
a traffic law has been violated. State v. Williams, 401 Md. 676, 934 
A.2d 38 (2007). Specifically, the Court stated that a traffic stop based 
on an officer's observation that window tint on a vehicle is in violation 
of Maryland law is not constitutional if the officer cannot credibly 
articulate the difference between a properly and improperly tinted 
window. Id. at 692, 934 A.2d at 47-48. 
On May 8, 2006, Harford County Deputy Sheriff Wood ("Deputy 
Wood"), was advised that a black Mercury Grand Marquis with dark 
window tint and a specific license plate number was possibly carrying 
a controlled dangerous substance ("CDS"). At approximately 12:40 
a.m., Deputy Wood observed the vehicle and alerted a nearby K-9 unit 
before he initiated the stop. Deputy Wood had not observed the 
driver, Arvel D. Williams ("Williams"), violate any traffic laws prior 
to the stop. However, Deputy Wood stopped Williams because 
Deputy Wood observed that the window tint on Williams' vehicle was 
darker than "normal." At the time of the stop, Deputy Wood had 
. neither received prior training with respect to window tinting, nor did 
he possess a tint meter, which can discern whether tint exceeds the 
statutory limit. 
Deputy Wood previously issued approximately twelve repair orders 
for tinting violations. Based on his observations, Deputy Wood chose 
to issue a repair order to Williams. While preparing the repair order 
and running a license and warrant check on Williams, the K-9 unit 
arrived and alerted to CDS in Williams' car. After a subsequent search 
of the vehicle revealed suspected cocaine and marijuana, Deputy 
Wood arrested Williams. Four days after Williams' arrest, Williams 
took his vehicle to the State Police Automotive Safety Division, where 
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tests revealed that the windows of his vehicle satisfied the Maryland 
requirement of thirty-five percent light transmittance. 
Because Williams' vehicle passed the light transmittance test, the 
Circuit Court for Harford County granted Williams' motion to 
suppress the CDS from evidence, stating that: "[wlhen you can't find 
anything else to stop the car for, [you should not] be able to stop him 
because the window tinting appears to be too dark, when, in fact, it's 
not too dark." The circuit court further stated that the State must 
establish that the police officer was correct in his or her judgment that 
a traffic violation had occurred or else lose the right to admit the 
evidence discovered pursuant to the stop. The State subsequently 
appealed to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, but the Court 
of Appeals of Maryland granted certiorari prior to proceedings in the 
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland. 
Section 22-406(i)(2)of the Transportation Article of the Maryland 
Code provides that if a police officer observes a vehicle in operation 
that does not allow at least thirty-five percent light transmittance 
through its windows, the officer is permitted to stop the vehicle and 
issue a citation and repair work order. Williams, 401 Md. at 683, 934 
A.2d at 42. Deputy Wood used the pretext of such a window tint 
violation to stop and search Williams' vehicle. !d. at 679, 934 A.2d at 
40. This type of stop, commonly referred to as a Whren stop, occurs 
when a police officer pulls over a vehicle for a specific purpose, such 
as suspicion of drug possession, by using the guise of another traffic 
violation committed by the driver in question. Williams, 401 Md. at 
685,934 A.2d at 43-44 (citing Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 
(1996)). Whren stops are constitutional, provided that the officer has 
sufficient cause to believe that a traffic violation has actually occurred. 
Williams, 401 Md. at 685,934 A.2d at 44. 
Not only was Deputy Wood admittedly untrained in identifying 
illegal window tint, his visual observation of Williams' window only 
enabled him to describe it as "[a]ppear[ing] darker than a normal 
window . . . without tinting." Id. at 680, 934 A.2d at 41. Deputy 
Wood elaborated on his suppression hearing testimony by further 
specifying that he stopped the vehicle merely because there was tint on 
the window. !d. at 681, 934 A.2d at 41. The Court, although it 
affirmed the circuit court's ruling, found that a police officer need not 
be correct in his or her belief that a traffic violation has occurred, but 
rather the officer must have reasonable articulable suspicion that a 
violation has occurred. Id. at 686, 934 A.2d at 44-45. Such a finding 
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would be inconsistent with both pre-Whren and post-Whren 
jurisprudence. Williams, 401 Md. at 686, 934 A.2d at 44-45. 
In evaluating the Williams case, the Court looked to clarify existing 
ambiguity as to what will justify a traffic stop. Id. at 687, 934 A.2d at 
44. The Whren decision seemed to establish a probable cause standard 
for pretextual stops, whereas the Terry v. Ohio decision only required 
reasonable articulable suspicion. Williams, 401 Md. at 690, 934 A.2d 
at 45-46 (citing Whren, 517 U.S. 806 (1996); and Terry, 392 U.S. 1 
(1968)). The post-Whren decision of Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113 
(1998), supports the reasonable articulable suspicion standard. 
Williams, 401 Md. at 689,934 A.2d at 46. Most courts have chosen to 
follow that standard, finding that if an officer had reasonable 
articulable suspicion that a traffic law had been violated, the stop is 
valid under the Fourth Amendment. Williams, 401 Md. at 690, 934 
A.2d at 46. 
Further, the Court evaluated Deputy Wood's experience and 
observations in determining that he did not have reasonable articulable 
suspicion that the window tint violated Maryland law to justify the 
traffic stop. Id. at 691, 934 A.2d at 47. The Court feared that if it 
were to admit the evidence seized during Deputy Wood's stop of 
Williams, Maryland law would effectively allow police officers to pull 
over any vehicle with tinted windows. Id. at 692, 934 A.2d at 47. 
Instead, the Court clarified that a police officer must have a 
suspicion that there has been a violation of the Maryland window 
tinting regulations in order to stop a vehicle for such a violation. Id. at 
692, 934 A.2d at 47. In other words, if an officer chooses to stop a 
vehicle for a possible window tint violation based solely on a visual 
observation of the vehicle, the officer must be able to discern a 
properly tinted window from a window that does not allow the 
required thirty-five percent light transmittance. Id. at 692, 934 A.2d at 
47. In establishing this standard, and upholding the suppression of the 
CDS, the Court recognized the lack of sophistication Deputy Wood 
possessed with regard to the degree of window tinting. Id. at 691, 934 
A.2d at 47. To stop Williams merely because his windows were tinted 
was clearly unconstitutional without a reasonable articulable suspicion 
that illegal activity or a traffic violation occurred. !d. at 692, 934 A.2d 
at 47. 
In concurring with the overall decision, Chief Judge Bell and Judge 
Greene state that they would apply an even stronger standard for 
Whren stops by requiring police officers to show probable cause as the 
basis of a stop. Williams, 401 Md. at 692-93, 934 A.2d at 48 (Bell, 
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c.J. and Green, J., concurring in part). The dissent felt that the traffic 
stop of Williams' vehicle was supported by reasonable articulable 
suspicion.ld. at 693, 934 A.2d at 48 (Battaglia, J., dissenting). Thus, 
the dissent supports the overall constitutional protection that this 
decision provides. 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland defends the ever-shrinking 
constitutional rights of citizens with this decision. By suppressing the 
CDS from evidence and allowing an otherwise guilty possessor or 
distributor of CDS to escape punishment, the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland sends a harsh message. Police officers must realize that if 
they do not comply with the constitutional rights of individuals, 
potential criminals will go free. If Deputy Wood had continued tailing 
Williams' vehicle until Williams actually broke a traffic law, as 
opposed to attempting to create a premise for a traffic stop, the 
evidence may not have been suppressed. Conversely, if the Court 
would have chosen to uphold the stop and seizure as constitutional, it 
would have led to a great number of random stops of law abiding 
vehicles, merely because their owners have chosen to put tint on their 
windows. To impose such a standard would have conflicted with a 
critical aspect of the Fourth Amendment. Instead, the Court made the 
correct decision and protected its citizens from unreasonable searches 
and seizures. 
